We study the classic setting of envy-free pricing, in which a single seller chooses prices for its many items, with the goal of maximizing revenue once the items are allocated. Despite the large body of work addressing such settings, most versions of this problem have resisted good approximation factors for maximizing revenue; this is true even for the classic unit-demand case. In this article, we study envy-free pricing with unit-demand buyers, but unlike previous work we focus on large markets: ones in which the demand of each buyer is infinitesimally small compared to the size of the overall market. We assume that the buyer valuations for the items they desire have a nice (although reasonable) structure, that is, that the aggregate buyer demand has a monotone hazard rate and that the values of every buyer type come from the same support.
INTRODUCTION
How should a seller controlling multiple goods choose prices for these goods, so that these prices yield good revenue and yet are efficiently computable? This question is among the most 16:4 E. Anshelevich et al. We next generalize the uniform peak (or support) assumption and consider markets where every buyer type i has a (potentially different) support [λ min i , λ max i ]. For this setting, our results are parameterized by a factor Δ that equals the ratio of the maximum λ max i to the minimum λ max i across buyer types. We show a O (1 + log Δ)-approximation to the optimal revenue in this setting for MHR inverse demand, and thus imply that as long as the valuations for different buyer types are not too different, we can still extract high revenue. Moreover, we show that this O (1 + log Δ)approximate solution also guarantees one-fourth of the optimum social welfare. Although the actual buyer demand may be quite asymmetric, our result depends only on the difference in the peak of the supports; it is reasonable to expect that this difference is not too large if the goods are similar. An O (1 + log Δ) approximation to profit is a strict improvement over previous results that are similar in spirit (Bansal et al. 2010; Guruswami et al. 2005) ; in such articles, it is typical for the approximation factor to be logarithmic in the support size max i { λ max i λ min i }. In comparison, our general result indicates that under reasonable assumptions (monotone hazard rate), one can obtain approximation factors that are independent of the "size of the support," which could potentially be much larger than Δ.
We now summarize the two high-level contributions that enable our results.
(1) We provide a general framework to derive good algorithms for large markets with production costs, extensively using techniques from the theory of min-cost flows.
(2) Our constant-approximation factors depend crucially on the insight that we gain on the prices in the revenue-maximizing solution. In contrast to previous work, where the approximation factor of the revenue of the computed solution is usually obtained by comparing it to the optimum social welfare (Cheung and Swamy 2008; Guruswami et al. 2005) (which is an upper bound on optimum revenue), we are able to directly compare the revenue of our solution to the profit-maximizing solution.
Related Work
Our work is a part of a rather extensive body of literature studying envy-free or item-pricing; the field is too vast to survey here, and we will only sample the most relevant results. The Unit-Demand Pricing (UDP) problem, where buyers have different valuations for different items, was first considered in Guruswami et al. (2005) , which gave a O (log |B|)-approximation algorithm for maximizing revenue. The version that we study (each buyer has equal valuation for all items in S i , and 0 otherwise) has been referred to as UDP-MIN or UDP with Uniform Valuations. Surprisingly, the addition of uniform values has not lead to any improved algorithms for the general UDP problem. Moreover, recent complexity results (Briest and Krysta 2011; Chalermsook et al. 2012) indicate that a sub-logarithmic-approximation factor may be unlikely for both problems. Assuming more structure on the combinatorial aspect of UDP (i.e., sets S i stating which buyers have access to which items) has yielded more tractable instances. For example, good approximation algorithms exist when each item is desired by at most k buyer types Im et al. 2012) . For settings with budgeted buyers who have access to all items but have a limit on the amount of money they can spend, Feldman et al. (2012) give a 0.5-approximation algorithm; we remark that budgeted buyers can be captured with an inverse demand λ(x ) = c x . In contrast, ours is among the few articles that makes no assumptions on the demand sets S i but still obtains a constant-approximation factor. Finally, another active line of work has looked at envy-free pricing when each buyer demands a single bundle of items (Single-Minded Pricing) . For more details, the reader is asked to refer to Briest and Krysta (2011) and Cheung and Swamy (2008) , and some of the references therein.
More broadly, our work bears certain similarities to algorithmic pricing mechanisms (Chawla et al. 2007 ) in a Bayesian setting, especially posted price mechanisms. In fact, the aggregate demand that we consider can be interpreted as buyers deriving values from a known distribution. Although posted pricing provides excellent guarantees, even in multi-parameter settings (Chawla et al. 2010; Feldman et al. 2015) , the mechanisms seldom result in envy-free allocations, because it is assumed that buyers choose items sequentially. At a high level, our work is a part of the literature exploring the space of multi-parameter settings with some structure. In addition to a valuation, buyers have a demand set (S i ) in our model, whereas researchers have looked at other models where the additional parameter is the quantity demanded or a position in a metric space .
Envy-free pricing to maximize welfare coincides with the notion of Walrasian Equilibrium minus the market clearing constraint. In large markets such as ours, Walrasian Equilibria are guaranteed to exist (Azevedo et al. 2013) , although their revenue may be poor. In discrete markets, Walrasian prices are not guaranteed to exist and, so, the focus has been on solutions that are approximately envy-free but still guarantee good welfare (Feldman et al. 2016; Chen and Rudra 2008) . There has also been some work on approximating both revenue and welfare over a restricted space of solutions: for instance, the space of all equilibria in GSP (Lucier et al. 2012) , or all competitive equilibria for sharp multi-unit demand . In contrast, bi-criteria approximations like ours, which compare both objectives for the same solution to the unrestricted global optima, have not been previously considered in envy-free literature, to the best of our knowledge.
Finally, since the original publication of the conference version of this work , an extension of (only) the bicriteria results in the current work appeared in a follow-up article by the same authors (Anshelevich et al. 2016 ). However, it is pertinent to remark that while the results in the subsequent work apply to markets where buyer behavior is more general than unitdemand, the algorithm used in that work is less involved and the bounds obtained are somewhat weaker. For instance, for markets with unit-demand buyers having log-concave inverse demand functions, provide a (2e, 2)-bicriteria (profit, welfare) approximation for a special class of convex cost functions, whereas we are able to obtain a (e, 2)-approximation for general convex functions.
MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We study the pricing problem faced by a central seller controlling a set S of goods with a large number of unit-demand buyers. We will denote each set of buyers who have the same set of desired items S i ⊆ S by B i . Sometimes, we will also refer to B i as being the buyer type; two buyers having the same type B i means simply that they have the same set of desired items S i . We model the market structure as a bipartite graph G = (B ∪ S, E) where there is an edge between each buyer type B i and every good in S i . For every individual buyer j ∈ B i , her valuation is v j for items in her demand set S i and 0 otherwise. Note that different buyers belonging to the same type B i can have different valuations for the items in S i . Aggregate Demand and Production Cost: Every individual buyer's demand is infinitesimal compared to the market size. Therefore, we can model the aggregate demand of all buyers having type B i using an inverse demand function λ i (x ); v = λ i (x i ) means that x i of these buyers have a value of v or more for the items in S i . As an example, consider λ i (x ) = 1 − x for x ∈ [0, 1]. This means that the total population of buyers with type B i is one; λ i (0.25) = 0.75 implies that onefourth of these buyers have a valuation of 0.75 or more. Finally, the seller incurs a production cost of C t (x ) for producing x amount of good t ∈ S. Best-Reponse and Envy-Freeness: A complete solution consists of prices and an allocation and is specified by three vectors ( p, x, y) . The seller's strategy is to select a price vector p, where p t is the price on item t ∈ S. We define x to be the buyer demand vector such that x i is the amount of good allocated to buyers from type B i . Finally, y is the allocation such that y t is the total amount of good t allocated to buyers and y t (i), the amount to buyer type i. We only consider allocations y that are feasible with x and G: for all i, t y t (i) should equal x i , and buyers in B i must only receive allocations of items belonging to S i . Then, -Given p, we let p i denote the minimum price available to buyers from type B i , that is, p i = min t ∈S i p t . -The buyer demand x is said to be a best-response to the prices p iff ∀B i one of the following is satisfied: (i) p i = λ i (x i ) or (ii) p i < λ i (x i ) and x i = T i , where T i is the total population of buyers having this type. That is, a population of x i buyers from B i have a value of p i or larger, and thus are maximizing their utility by deciding to purchase items at a price of p i . -Given p and x, the allocation y is said to be envy-free if buyer demand is a best-response to the prices and if for every buyer the items they are allocated are the lowest priced items available to them, that is, y t (i) > 0 ⇒ p t = p i .
Tie-Breaking. A given vector of prices of p and demand x may admit multiple envy-free allocations when buyers of a given type have more than one minimally priced good available to them. In such an event, we assume that the seller has the ability to resolve ties and, therefore, restrict our focus to the cost-minimizing envy-free allocation y consistent with ( p, x) . Our notion is consistent with almost all of the articles in the envy-free item pricing literature, where it is extremely standard to assume that ties are broken in favor of the seller.
Our main objective is an envy-free solution that maximizes revenue. Given ( p, x, y) , the revenue of the seller is the total payment minus costs incurred, that is,
(if solution is envy-free).
Note that as long as the instance is clear, we will use C ( y) := t ∈S C t (y t ) to denote the total cost of all items when the allocation is y. We also consider solutions with good social welfare, that is, the total utility of all the buyers plus that of the seller. As long as the solution is envy-free, buyers are utility-maximizing, and so the aggregate utility of buyers belonging to type i is the sum of their values minus payments, which is
Since the payments cancel out, the total social welfare of a solution is equal to
For the rest of this work, we use the notation ( p opt , x opt , y opt ) to denote an envy-free solution maximizing revenue and ( x * , y * ) to denote an allocation that maximizes welfare (since welfare depends only on the allocation, not the prices).
We make the following assumptions on the inverse demand and cost functions.
(1) λ i (x ) cannot increase with x. This is by definition: if x 1 buyers hold a value of v 1 or more and x 2 < x 1 , then the value of these x 2 buyers is at least v 1 .
(2) We also assume that λ i (x ) is continuously differentiable on (0,T i ) (here T i is the population of buyers in B i ) and has a monotone hazard rate (see definition below). Notice that λ i (x ) cannot be positive, since λ i is non-increasing. (3) For all t ∈ S, we take the production costs C t (y) to be convex, which is the norm in the literature. In addition, we assume that C t (y) is continuously differentiable and define c t (y) to be its derivative. All our results also hold if an item t has a limited supply of Y t , and C t (y) is only differentiable until y = Y t , at which point it becomes infinite.
Definition 2.1 (MHR). An inverse demand function λ(x ) is said to be log-concave if log(λ(x )) is concave in x. Equivalently, the inverse demand function is said to have a monotone hazard rate if
Log-concavity is a natural assumption that curtails the volatility of the inverse demand function, and it is not surprising that such functions have received a good deal of attention in the Economics literature (Amir 1996; Baldenius and Reichelstein 2000; Belleflamme and Peitz 2015; Liu et al. 2011) . Many commonly studied buyer distributions belong to this class: this includes uni-
, as well as power-law distributions with small exponents (λ(x ) = (a − x ) p ) (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005; . In fact, polynomial and, more generally, concave inverse demand functions that also satisfy the MHR property have independently been featured in a number of works (abo; Bulow and Pfleiderer 1983) owing to their strong applications. More generally, log-concavity is satisfied by most functions that do not possess a heavy-tail, that is, the demand is not more convex than an exponential distribution.
Demand Space and Valuation Space. As mentioned previously, inverse demand functions are quite popular in Economics as they provide a convenient means for studying social welfare in large markets. On the other hand, in the Bayesian mechanism design community, the norm is to model each atomic buyer's demand as a distribution on the buyer's valuation via a (cumulative) direct demand function, F (v) := 1 − λ −1 (v). In that literature, it is also commonly assumed that the direct demand distribution satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition in the valuation space, that is,
Distributions that are MHR in the valuation space are incompatible with our model, where the inverse demand function is assumed to be log-concave or MHR in the demand space. That being said, it is interesting to note the following points of overlap between this work and the literature in Mechanism design: (i) Several popular types of demand including all polynomial inverse demand functions satisfy the MHR condition in both the demand space and the valuation space; (ii) Every log-concave inverse demand function is regular (see Nisan et al. (2007) for the definition) in the valuation space. Therefore, our model captures several well-motivated functions such as inelastic CED and exponential inverse demand that do not satisfy the monotone hazard rate condition in the valuation space.
In the rest of this work, we will use the term MHR to denote functions that are log-concave in the demand space, that is, consistent with Definition 2.1. The first problem that we study in this work is that of envy-free revenue maximization when all of the buyer types have MHR inverse demand functions. Although the monotone hazard rate requirement gives the appearance of being somewhat restrictive, this assumption is actually rather weak. We show that even with only MHR demand, our framework encompasses the well-studied unit-demand pricing problem in finite markets. To simplify discussion, henceforth, we will use "buyer" interchangeably with "buyer type" as long as the context is clear.
Proposition 2.2. Any UDP instance with uniform valuations in markets with a finite number of buyers can be reduced to an instance of our problem where all buyer types have monotone hazard rate inverse demand.
Recall that the UDP problem in finite markets is described by a finite set of buyers B , so every buyer i ∈ B has a set of desired items S i ⊆ S and a single numerical value v i , which is her valuation for one unit of any of the items in S i . The objective, once again, is to compute a solution (prices, envy-free allocation) that maximizes revenue.
Proof. First consider a UDP-Uniform-Valuations (UDP-UV) problem with unlimited supply on the items. Let B be the set of buyers with unit demand and valuation v i and S be the set of items. Reducing this to an instance of our problem, create one buyer type for every i ∈ B such that λ i (x ) = v i for x ≤ 1 and 0 otherwise. Clearly λ i is continuously differentiable in (0, 1) and is MHR in that interval, so these functions do follow our framework. Next, the items are the same as S and the cost functions are zero everywhere.
Consider a solution of U DP − UV ; clearly, the solution is feasible for our instance and has the same value of the objective function. Consider a solution of our problem; we show that there exists a solution of UDP-UV with equal or larger revenue. Suppose that some buyer is receiving a positive but fractional allocation, then we can simply increase the allocation of this buyer to one leading to a solution with increased profit. If there exists some i ∈ B sending flow to more than one item, we can simply transfer all of the flow to any one of these items without any decrease in profit. Therefore, we can convert any allocation to an integral allocation and, therefore, a feasible solution for UDP-UV with the same prices. Therefore, the optima must also coincide.
Next, what if we have limited supply? We have already shown how to model these limited supply functions using cost. That is, we can set C t (x ) = 0 for x ≤ γ t and C t (x ) = ∞ for x > γ t , where γ t is the capacity of the item. Alternatively, we can also take C t (x ) to be zero until x gets very close to γ t at which point C t starts increasing very fast upto a large number at C t (γ t ). We assume that the capacities or supply of every item is integral in the original UDP-UV instance, or else we round it down while forming our instance. So any solution for UDP-UV is still a feasible solution for our problem. Consider any solution for our problem with finite cost (we can safely ignore the solutions where capacities are violated). Once again, suppose that some buyer is receiving a fractional allocation. Either we can increase the allocation to this buyer to one without violating the supply constraints or, since all the supplies are integral, we can increase the allocation of this buyer to one, reducing the allocations of some other buyers with fraction allocation without any change in profit. In this way, we can convert the solution to one where every buyer is receiving an integral amount of the good. Similarly, we can rearrange flow on the items, so every buyer is receiving one unit of one single good without violating capacity constraints (integral capacities imply integral flows).
Therefore, our setting strictly generalizes previously studied UDP problems, which are unlikely to admit sub-logarithmic-approximation factors (Briest and Krysta 2011; Chalermsook et al. 2012) . Our main contribution, however, is proving that the addition of a little bit of structure (via uniform peak or support) to our general framework provides much greater insight into the nature of the revenue-maximizing solution, and leads to good algorithms.
Allocations as Bipartite Network Flows and Min-Cost Flows
We can view a feasible allocation y as a flow from the items S to the buyers with a demand of x, assuming that G is fixed. Notice that there are several feasible flows for a given demand x. We will be most interested in min-cost flows: the feasible allocation y that also minimizes the total production cost C ( y). The min-cost flow is independent of the prices and, given x, can be computed efficiently using a convex program (for example, see Convex Program 2 for social welfare maximization). We introduce some additional notation corresponding to min-cost flows here. For a flow y, we define r i ( y) to be the minimum marginal cost c t (y t ) of all items received by buyer i (i.e., with y t (i) > 0). Due to KKT conditions, if y is a min-cost flow, then i is only allocated items with marginal cost equal to the minimum marginal cost of any item available to i, that is, for a min-cost flow r i ( y) = min (i,t ) ∈E c t (y t ).
We reiterate that given a price vector p, the best-response buyer demand x can be computed
, and given ( p, x ), we can always determine an envyfree allocation y. Interestingly, the solutions returned by our algorithms are not only envy-free, but also will use min-cost flows for the corresponding buyer demand x. Finally, the proof of our 1.88-Approximation Algorithm crucially uses the following property that relates best-response allocations and min-cost flows. The lemma formalizes the intuitive idea that when the demand of every buyer decreases, the cost of production of each good (in the min-cost flow) also decreases. Following this, we point out an obvious connection between decreasing demand and increasing prices that will be useful in our algorithms. Lemma 2.3. Consider two buyer demand vectors x 1 and x 2 such that x 1 ≤ x 2 . Let y 1 , y 2 be the minimum-cost flows for the buyer demands x 1 and x 2 , respectively. Then,
Proof. The second part of the lemma follows directly from the first part. Indeed, suppose that a buyer i received some quantity of item t in y 2 , then whatever item she receives in y 1 has to have a marginal that is smaller or equal to that of t. We know that the marginal cost of t in y 1 is not larger than that in y 2 .
We now proceed to prove the first part by contradiction: suppose for some item t, c t (y 1 t ) > c t (y 2 t ). Since the marginal cost function is monotone non-decreasing, this must mean that y 1 t > y 2 t . Now let us construct the following graph G = (S, E ), where S is the set of all items. We say that there is a directed edge from item t 1 to t 2 if ∃ some buyer i, such that y 1 t 1 (i) > y 2 t 1 (i) and y 1 t 2 (i) < y 2 t 2 (i).
In simple terms, this means that i is receiving more of t 2 and less of t 1 in y 2 than what she received in y 1 . This also means that i is receiving non-zero amounts of t 1 in y 1 and t 2 in y 2 . Now, look at item t. Since the total allocation of this item is smaller in y 2 , this must mean that there is at least one buyer i who is sending less flow on t in y 2 as compared to before. However, the total demand of i is only larger in x 2 , which means there must be some other item t 1 to which she is sending more flow than before. This implies that (t, t 1 ) ∈ E .
Suppose that S t represents the set of items that are reachable from t in G , including t itself. We have already shown that S t has at least one item other than t. Our first claim is that all the nodes in S t have a marginal cost in y 2 that is no larger than the marginal cost of t in the same allocation. To show this, consider an edge (t 1 , t 2 ), where both the items belong to S t . By definition, there must be some buyer who has access to both these items and is sending non-zero flow on t 2 in y 2 . Since y 2 is a min-cost allocation, it means the marginal cost of t 2 in y 2 must be smaller than or equal to that of t 1 in the same min-cost allocation. Applying this transitively from t, all nodes reachable from t in G must have a marginal cost in y 2 smaller than or equal to c t (y 2 t ). Similarly, for (t 1 , t 2 ) ∈ E , both belonging to S t , some buyer has non-zero flow on t 1 in y 1 and this must imply that c t (y 1 t ) ≤ c t 1 (y 1 t 1 ) for all t 1 ∈ S t . Using these inequalities regarding the marginal 16:10 E. Anshelevich et al.
costs in y 1 and y 2 , we get for all t 1 ∈ S t ,
What this means is that for all the items in S t , the incoming flow is larger in y 1 as compared to y 2 . Suppose that B 1 t is the complete set of buyers who receive non-zero amounts of the items in S t in y 1 . Our final claim is that every buyer in B 1 t receives more or equal amount of the items in S t in y 2 as compared to y 1 . That is for buyers in B 1 t ,
Notice that for any buyer i if this is not true, then there must exist at least one t 1 ∈ S t , which she receives more in y 1 than y 2 . However, buyer i's total demand has increased in x 2 but the consumption from S t has decreased and so there must be some t 3 outside of S t to which she sends more flow in y 2 than y 1 . But this means that there must be an edge from t 1 to t 3 and so t 3 ∈ S t , a contradiction. Now, we are ready to prove our main result. Recall that ∀t 1 ∈ S t , y 1 t 1 > y 2 t 1 . Since for all t 1 ∈ S t , the incoming flow in y 1 can only come from the buyers in B 1 t :
This is a contradiction.
Corollary 2.4. Consider two price vectors p and p such that p ≥ p for every component. Let ( p, x, y) be a solution in which x is a best-response demand vector to prices p, and y is a min-cost flow with demand x. Let ( p , x , y ) be the similar solution for prices p . Then, for every t, either y t < y t or c t (y t ) = c t (y t ).
Proof. Higher prices imply that the demand vector is smaller. This allows us to apply Lemma 2.3, and the rest follows due to these being min-cost flows.
Corollary 2.5. Consider an instance (B 1 ∪ S, E 1 ) where the buyers have a demand vector x 1 and the corresponding min-cost flow is z 1 . Let (B 2 ∪ S, E 1 ∪ E 2 ) be another instance with B 1 ⊆ B 2 and E 2 only has edges between B 2 \ B 1 and S. Let x 2 be some demand vector for this instance and z 2 is the min-cost flow for this demand such that
. Proof. We can simply reduce the first instance to another instance where the set of buyers is B 2 , edges E 1 ∪ E 2 but the demand for the additional buyers is zero. Now, the corollary reduces to Lemma 2.3.
Optimal Solutions
Recall that we defined ( p opt , x opt , y opt ) to denote the revenue maximizing pricing solution and ( x * , y * ) to be the social welfare maximizing allocation. We now shed some light on the structure of these two solutions before tackling questions of a computational nature. First, from our definition of min-cost flows, it is not hard to see that y * is a min-cost flow with respect to the demand vector x * . However, general envy-free solutions, including ( p opt , x opt , y opt ), may not use min-cost flows, since envy-freeness constrains the buyers to use only the items with cheapest price, while min-cost flows form allocations to optimize production costs. That being said, it is pertinent to note that the allocation y opt in the revenue maximizing solution must be of minimum cost among the set of all envy-free allocations consistent with the vectors ( p opt , x opt ).
Given a graph G, functions λ i and C t , the solution ( x * , y * ) maximizing social welfare can be computed efficiently using the following convex program:
(2)
Note that the objective is concave as λ i (x ) is non-increasing and C j (y) is convex. The (x ) i j 's denote the total amount of good j consumed by the buyers having type B i . We also remark here that once the welfare maximizing solution is computed, there exist prices p * so ( x * , y * ) is an envyfree allocation to these prices. Generally, these prices are the dual variables to the above convex program; however, in the special case where both the demand and cost functions are continuously differentiable, we can use the marginal production costs to select p * . Proposition 2.6 illustrates this idea. The main challenge, therefore, is to compute prices that (approximately) maximize revenue and perhaps, simultaneously welfare.
As a first step toward a better understanding of revenue maximization in our setting, we argue why it is unlikely that a convex programming based approach could be used to compute (approximately) profit maximizing item prices. First, the convex program for social welfare maximization only yields an allocation of goods to buyers and is completely independent of the problem of computing envy-free pricing solutions. The existence of item prices that support such an allocation and guarantee envy-freeness is a non-trivial consequence of the duality conditions that may not hold for convex programs with different objectives.
More concretely, suppose that we consider a convex program similar to Equation (2) but with the following new objective that better reflects revenue maximization:
The optimum solution corresponding to such a program may allocate the same good to two buyers with vastly different marginal utilities for the same, that is, if x o denotes the optimum solution to the new program for a given instance and i 1 , i 2 are two buyers receiving the same good, then
Consequently, combining the dual prices (or any other prices for that matter) with the optimum allocation may not guarantee envy-freeness as the buyer demand will no longer be a best-response to the prices. In other words, the hardness of the revenue maximization problem is driven by the need for envy-freeness. Finally, we remark that a linear programming approach yields welfare maximizing item prices even for the case of discrete markets with a finite number of unit-demand buyers (Nisan et al. 2007; Guruswami et al. 2005) . However, for the same small market setting, it is known that no constant factor approximation algorithm exists for the revenue maximization problem with or without linear programming (Briest and Krysta 2011) . Proposition 2.6. Consider the optimum solution x * , y * for a given instance. Define the price vector p * as p * t = c t (y * t ) for item t. Then ( p * , x * , y * ) is an envy-free solution to the prices. Moreover, y * is a min-cost flow with respect to demand x * .
Proof. Look at the optimum solution and the prices p * t = c t (y * t ). We need to prove that (i) each buyer purchases only from the set of cheapest goods available to her and (ii) the buyer demand is a best-response to these prices. We now prove the first part by contradiction. Indeed, assume that some buyer i has non-zero flow on item t and access to item t such that
. Therefore, one can shift some infinitesimal flow corresponding to buyer i from t to t and reduce the cost of the optimal solution, a contradiction. For the second part, we use the KKT conditions for Convex Program 2, and get that for every buyer i and good t ∈ S i that the buyer sends non-zero flow to,
If this were not true, then one could always reduce the flow sent from buyer i to good t by an infinitesimal amount and strictly improve upon the social welfare, a contradiction. Moreover, the condition holds with equality unless x i = T i . Also, notice that if there exists another flow satisfying the same buyer demand but with a smaller cost, then we can use that flow and reduce the cost of the optimal solution. So y * is a min-cost flow.
The vector of prices p * play an important role in our algorithms: they serve as the initial prices for our ascending-price process. Lemma 2.7 highlights the reason for this choice, p * is a lower bound for the prices in the revenue-maximizing solution, albeit a weak one. In Section 3, we give an "almost-tight" lower bound on the revenue-maximizing prices, which allows us to efficiently approximate it.
That is, the prices at the welfare maximizing solution provide a weak lower bound for optimal prices.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that in the optimal solution some items have a price strictly smaller than their price in p * . Let S min be the subset of such items with the smallest price (call it p min ). Intuitively, since the items in S min have a smaller price in p opt than in p * , buyers who consume from this set of goods must in fact have a higher demand in the profit maximizing solution. Therefore, it must be the case that some good in S min has a higher production cost in the profit maximizing solution. This intuition is formally proved in the online Appendix to this article. Therefore, we get that ∃ t min ∈ S min , such that c t min (y * t min ) ≤ c t min (y opt t min ). Construct a directed graph G whose vertices are the same as in G but with the following edges E :
Let S + min be the set of items that are reachable from t min and B + min be the set of buyers reachable from t min in this graph G . We make two simple observations here: first, for every item t ∈ S + min , its price must equal p min . Second, every buyer in B + min is only receiving allocations of the items in S + min and has no edge in E to any item outside of S + min priced at p min . We know that in the welfare maximizer, for every item t, p * t = c t (y * t ). But, we know that for t min ,
. This cannot be a good sign for any profit maximizing solution, because the price has to be at least the marginal cost, otherwise the seller can increase his price, lower the marginal cost and improve profits. We show this more formally.
Look at the revenue-maximizing solution and increase the price of only the items in S + min by a sufficiently small ϵ. Clearly, for a small enough ϵ, the best response of all buyers in B + min is to still purchase items from S + min , and the (envy-free) allocation for other buyers remains the same. Suppose that x 1 and x 2 (≤ x 1 ) represent the demand due to the buyers in B + min at OPT and the increased price solution, respectively, and y 2 t , the total amount of item t consumed at the new price. Recall that for all items of interest, p min < c t (y opt t ). For a small enough price increase, the demand only drops by a small amount and, therefore, by choosing ϵ carefully, we can ensure that
. Then, the difference in profit due to the price increase is
This is a contradiction with the fact that OPT maximizes the profit.
For the rest of this article, we will only consider solutions where the prices dominate p * .
REVENUE MAXIMIZATION ALGORITHM FOR UNIFORM PEAK VALUATIONS
For markets with a large number of buyers, it often makes sense to assume that the inverse demand functions λ i have the same support [λ min , λ max ] for all i, which is what we do in this section. In fact, all our results hold as long as the peak values for every λ i are the same, that is, that λ max = λ i (0) is the same for all i. We term this the uniform peak assumption.
Assumption. (Uniform Peak Markets) There exists some λ max > 0, such that for every buyer i,
The assumption of uniform peaks is not without loss of generality as the monotone hazard rate condition precludes the addition of arbitrary point masses to instances where different demand functions may not have the same peak. However, for markets comprising similar types of goods, such as the PEV charging example, it is reasonable to make the uniform peak assumption independent of the class of buyer demand functions. Such a situation could arise, for example, when each buyer type is sampled (albeit at different rates) from a a large, aggregate population of buyers represented by a global distribution λ(x ), that is, λ i (x ) = λ(α i x ) for some α i ≥ 0. In the context of our PEV application, where a homogeneous good (energy) is sold at different time intervals, it is natural to motivate λ(x ) as the aggregate inverse demand curve of all electric vehicle owners. In other words, at each price point, the buyers having a valuation of λ(x ) are proportionally split into different buyer types based on the overall population of each type of buyer.
Of course, the results in this section hold for settings that are more general than just proportionally sampled markets. In later sections, we relax the uniform peak assumption and prove that our approximation factor for profit degrades gracefully (modulo an additional constant factor) as the peak valuations corresponding to different buyer types become more and more asymmetric. At a high level, our results indicate that in large markets, the "difference in peak valuations" across buyer types is perhaps a more appropriate parameter (than say the number of buyers or types) for the purpose of characterizing revenue; indeed, in Proposition 4.6, we show that all of our results are tight (up to a constant factor) in terms of their dependence on Δ, the ratio of the maximum to the minimum peak across buyer types. In light of this, we argue that the uniform peak assumption is a natural starting point for large markets. Alternatively, all of the results in this section carry over even when the uniform peak assumption is violated as long as the maximum price of any good is constrained to be smaller than or equal to min i ∈B λ i (0). Such price restrictions could be a natural byproduct of anti-discrimination or fair pricing laws that preempt sellers from preventing the participation of an entire buyer type (when the price is larger than λ i (0)).
We refer to the problem of maximizing revenue in markets as the Unit Demand Pricing problem. Not too surprisingly, this problem remains NP-Hard even when the demand functions have uniform peak valuations.
Proposition 3.1. The Unit Demand Pricing problem in large markets with MHR inverse demand and uniform peaks (λ i (0) = λ max for all i) is NP-Hard even with unlimited supply.
Proof. We just sketch the proof here, since the general idea is the same as the hardness proof in Guruswami et al. (2005) . Consider an instance of vertex cover. Reducing this to our problem, there is one buyer for each vertex and r buyers for every edge e such that r = |V | = n. Moreover, there is also one item in S for every vertex of the original instance All vertex buyers have unit demand with valuation 2, that is, λ i (x ) = 2 for x ≤ 1 and 0 otherwise. All the edge buyers have the following MHR inverse demand function λ i (x ) = 2 − x. The vertex buyers have access only to the corresponding vertex item and the edge buyers have access to items corresponding to its two end points.
First, it is not hard to see that the maximum profit from the set of r buyers for an edge is r (each of these can give only a max profit of 1 when p = 1). Next, in any solution of our problem, the items whose prices are less than 2 must form a vertex cover of the original graph. Moreover, the price of these sellers is at most 1 + 1 2r . Say you are given some solution where there are k nodes priced below 2, then the profit of this solution is at least 2(n − k ) + k + mr , where m is the number of edges. This is obtained by pricing all these nodes at 1. Next, the profit of this solution is at most, 2(n − k ) + k (1 + 1 2r ) + mr . Now, it is not hard to show that any optimal solution must be a minimal vertex cover.
In this section, we establish our main result: a 1.877-approximation algorithm for maximizing revenue, which works as long as the inverse demand functions are MHR and have uniform peak values. We begin with a general, parameter-dependent procedure for generating prices, which will be a building block of both this algorithm, and the algorithms in later sections. Although the algorithm is described here as a more intuitive continuous-time procedure, it can be efficiently implemented using O (|B| log λ max ) min-cost flow computations, as we argue later.
Algorithm 1 begins by pricing all the items at the price vector p * , which as we mentioned makes ( p * , x * , y * ) an envy-free allocation. We gradually increase prices on the items belonging to an "active set," initialized to be the set of cheapest items in p * and the buyers receiving these items. At each stage, every item in the active set has the same price (active price) allowing us to compute the min-cost flow for only the active buyers and items. As we increase the active price, if it equals p * t for some inactive t, we add t and buyers using t to the active set. An item t remains active until a stopping condition dependent on a parameter k ≥ 1 is reached (Equation (3)); once this happens the price of item t becomes fixed, and item t is removed from the active set along with buyers using t. The simple ascending-price algorithm stops once all the items have met the stopping criterion.
Economic Interpretation of Algorithm. Algorithm 1 is similar in spirit to traditional ascending price procedures for computing welfare maximizing pricing solutions (Demange et al. 1986 ). Typically, these algorithms involve increasing the price of over-demanded goods in each round until a solution is reached wherein the marginal cost of producing an extra copy of good equals each buyer's marginal utility for purchasing an extra unit. In Algorithm 1, the same highlevel approach is adapted for the profit-maximization problem by means of a novel stopping criterion. Analogously, in each round, the price of certain "less profitable" goods (marginal cost is ALGORITHM 1: Ascending-Price Procedure with Stop Parameter k Initialization Set initial prices on the items, p t = p * t ; ACTIVE ← All minimally priced items and all buyers using these items;
Increase the price of all ACTIVE items by an infinitesimal amount (All ACTIVE items have the same price, the active price); Compute the min-cost flow for the sub-graph induced by ACTIVE;
(We prove later: At every stage active buyers only receive allocations of active items); if t ∈ INACTIVE s.t p * t equals the active price then Remove t, buyers using t from INACTIVE and add to ACTIVE end if t ∈ ACTIVE meets the stopping criterion in the current solution then
Remove t, buyers using t from ACTIVE and add to FINISH end end
comparable to price of good) is uniformly increased until the marginal utility derived by buyers on a good is a factor larger than its marginal cost of production. Working Example. We now illustrate the various facets involved in the working of our algorithm (suppose that k = e) via a simple but non-trivial market with two buyer types (B 1 and B 2 ) and two goods (a and b) such that B 1 desires both of the goods whereas B 2 only has access to good b. Both of these goods are characterized via the cost function C (x ) = x 2 , while the inverse demand functions are defined as follows: λ 1 (x ) = 4e −x , λ 2 (x ) = 4 − 3x. In the social welfare maximizing solution, both the goods are priced at p * ≈ 1.66, almost all of buyer B 1 's demand is met by a, and this buyer only consumes a tiny amount of good b. The total amount of good consumed by buyer B 2 is smaller than that of B 1 .
The social welfare maximizing solution is the starting point for Algorithm 1. As the algorithm begins, both a and b are marked active, the initial active price is p * , and buyer B 1 consumes a non-zero amount of both of the goods. At the initial price, the stopping criterion is not satisfied as:
The algorithm proceeds by gradually increasing the price of both a and b, and at each price, recomputing the envy-free, min-cost flow. Interestingly, when the active price is p ≈ 2.18, buyer B 1 stops consuming good b at the cost-minimizing allocation. The stopping criterion is not met by either of the goods at this point, so we continue increasing the price. The first significant event occurs at active price p ≈ 2.217, where good a meet the stopping criterion, that is, x 1 ≈ 0.59, and it is easy to verify that p − 2x 1 ≥ 1 e (4 − 2x 1 ). Therefore, we mark B 1 , a as finished and remove them from the active set. However, good b does not meet the stopping criterion at p ≈ 2.217 and thus remains active along with buyer B 2 . In the "final round," we keep increasing the price of only good b until the active price p ≈ 2.221 at which b meets the stopping criterion and the algorithm terminates. Observe that in the final solution, buyer B 1 only consumes good a, but the solution is still envy-free as the price of good b is larger than that of a. Moreover, the algorithm outputs a solution where buyer B 2 is charged a higher price than B 1 : intuitively, this Thick edges indicate that buyers in a certain set (Active, Inactive or Finished) receive allocations only from the items in the same set. Dotted edges between a buyer set and an item set indicate although the buyers have access to the items in that set, they are not currently receiving any allocation of that item.
exploits the fact that the demand function corresponding to B 2 has more buyers concentrated at higher prices than that of B 1 .
The above algorithm has certain desirable properties that we prove later in this section. In particular, the solution returned is envy-free for all values of k; as k decreases, the final prices increase, and for an appropriate value of k (k = e), the prices obtained act as an almost-tight lower bound for the prices in the revenue maximizing solution p opt . Actually, as indicated in Figure 1 (for any value of k), the algorithm maintains envy-freeness at every intermediate stage. From the price hierarchy provided in the figure, one can deduce that at any given stage of the algorithm, buyers only purchase from the cheapest items available to them as (i) inactive buyers do not have access to the cheaper goods that are either active or finished, and (ii) no active buyer has an edge to a finished good. We formally prove this fact along with the best-response property required for envy-freeness in Proposition 3.6.
We now describe our actual algorithm to approximately maximize profit that uses the general procedure described in Algorithm 1. The algorithm is reasonably straightforward. We make two calls to Procedure 1 for k = e and k = √ e. ALGORITHM 2: 1.88-Approximate Algorithm to Maximize Profit Let π 1 be the profit of the solution returned by Algorithm 1 for k = e; Let π 2 be the profit of the solution returned by Algorithm 1 for k = √ e. Return max(π 1 , π 2 ) and its corresponding prices and allocation.
The following theorem is the central result of this article.
Theorem 3.2. Algorithm 2 returns an envy-free allocation, which is a (4 √ e − 2 − e) ≈ 1.877 approximation to the optimal profit.
The proof is quite involved and forms the main technical contribution of this article. We proceed slowly, first highlighting some useful properties of our general black-box procedure that hold for all k including envy-freeness, then we show how the prices obtained at certain values of k provide great insight into the actual revenue maximizing prices, and, finally, we prove the main claim.
Notation. For a given parameter k ≥ 1, we will use ( p k , x k , y k ) to denote the final solution returned by our algorithm. Every 'stage' of our algorithm corresponds to a unique value of the active price (i.e., price of all the active items), so we can refer to the allocation formed by the algorithm at some point as the allocation at active price p. Formally, we define x (p) to be the buyer demand vector when the active price is p, and y(p) is the allocation of items at that price. At any price p, for the inactive buyers x i (p) coincides with x * i and for inactive items y t (p) = y * t . For finished items (or buyers), the allocation (demand) is the same as it was when that item (buyer) met the stopping criterion and became finished. Finally, we use B A (p) to denote the buyers and S A (p) to denote the items in the active set when the active price is p; we define the analogous sets (B I (p), S I (p)), (B F (p), S F (p)) for the inactive and finished blocks, respectively.
Properties Regarding the Stopping Criterion
The following simple lemma shows that for a fixed value of k, if there are two items and the one with the larger marginal cost meets the stopping criterion, then the other must also satisfy the condition.
Proposition 3.3. Consider two items t, t at the same price p, and let y be some min-cost allocation such that c t (y t ) ≤ c t (y t ). If t satisfies the stopping criterion, then t must also satisfy the stopping criterion.
Proof. The proof follows from a rearrangement of Equation (3). The stopping criterion for t can also be written as λ max ≤ kp − (k − 1)c t (y t ). The term on the right-hand side is in turn no larger than kp − (k − 1)c t (y t ), which implies that t also satisfies the stopping criterion.
Our second proposition compares the prices of items in the solution returned by our algorithm for two different values of k. We say that vector a ≥ b iff each element of a is not smaller than its corresponding element of b.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that k 1 , k 2 ≥ 1 are two values of the stopping parameter with k 1 ≥ k 2 . Then, p k 2 ≥ p k 1 and x k 1 ≥ x k 2 .
Proof. Notice that the initial prices p * are independent of k. This means that whatever be the value of the stopping parameter k, an item enters the active set at the exact same value of the active price. Also, note that when an item becomes finished, all the buyers having an edge to this item must also be finished (or else why is it not using this item?). Suppose that during Algorithm 1 for k = k 2 , the items become finished in the order O = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , . . . , t |S | ), breaking ties arbitrarily. Then, clearly p k 2 t 1 ≤ p k 2 t 2 ≤ · · · ≤ p k 2 t |S | . Assume by contradiction that t is the item with the smallest index in O such that p k 2 t < p k 1 t . Consider the run of Algorithm 1 for k = k 1 and let A(p k 2 t ) be the buyers and items in the active set when the active price is p k 2 t . Clearly t belongs to the set but does not meet the stopping criterion yet. We claim that for any buyer i ∈ A(p k 2 t ), for the state of Algorithm 1(k = k 2 ) at active price p k 2 t , i belonged to the active set. Moreover, all the items in A(p k 2 t ) must have been active for the same active price but k = k 2 . Therefore, applying Corollary 2.5 comparing the contents of the active set at k = k 1 and k = k 2 , we conclude that the marginal cost of t at k = k 1 cannot be larger than its marginal cost for k = k 2 at the same active price. Therefore, it is not hard to see that for k = k 1 , t must satisfy the stopping condition at active price p k 2 t .
Price Hierarchy
The next proposition is a trivial observation from the definition of the algorithm, which we state without proof. It states that at a given active price p, the price of items in S F (p) are no larger than p, and the items in S I (p) cannot be smaller than p.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose at some given active price p, t 1 , t 2 , t 3 are three items such that t 1 ∈ S A (p), t 2 ∈ S I (p) and t 3 ∈ S F (p). Then,
where P t r (p) denotes the price of good t r during the execution of the algorithm at active price p.
We now establish some easy invariants that hold during the course of our algorithm. In particular, we show that there can be no edges between buyers in B I (p) and items in S A (p) or S F (p) and between buyers in B A (p) and items in S F (p).
Proposition 3.6. At any active price p, the following must be true:
(1) Suppose user i belongs to B I (p) and item t ∈ S A (p) or t ∈ S F (p). Then, there cannot be an edge between user i and item t.
(2) Suppose user i ∈ B A (p) and item t ∈ S F (p). Then, there cannot be an edge between user i and item t.
The invariants indicate a natural hierarchy in the partitions as shown in Figure 1 . Users who are inactive can only have edges to items that are inactive. Users that are active can only have edges to items that are active or inactive.
Proof. We prove these invariants by contradiction. First, suppose that for some i ∈ B I (p) and t ∈ S A (p), (i, t ) ∈ E. Since i is inactive, this must mean that every item t that i used in the optimum solution must have an initial price c t (y * t ) > p, where p is the active price. But since t ∈ S A (p), this must mean that at some p ≤ p, the active price must have been equal to the initial price c t (y * t ) of the item t. So, c t (y * t ) is smaller than c t (y * t ) where t is some item used by i in the optimum solution. Thus, if i had access to t, then we could have shifted an infinitesimal amount of flow to t and reduced the cost of the optimum solution, which is a contradiction. The proof for the case when t ∈ S F (p) is similar, since if an item is finished, then it must have been active at some lower price.
For the second invariant, assume that there is some i ∈ B A (p) and item t ∈ S F (p) such that i has access to item t. Let p be the price where t met the stopping criterion and was transferred to the finished set. If at this price, i used t, then by definition, i would have also been added to FINISH. This means that either i ∈ B I (p ) or i did not send any flow on item t. i ∈ B I (p ) contradicts the first invariant. Now suppose, t is some item that was allocated to user i at active price p . Then, since we computed a min-cost allocation inside the active set, c t (y t (p )) ≤ c t (y t (p )). However, by Proposition 3.3, t also meets the stopping criterion and thus i would have also been transferred to FINISH, a contradiction.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose that some item t belongs to the active set at two different active prices p 1 and p 2 with p 1 < p 2 , then c t (y t (p 1 )) ≥ c t (y t (p 2 )).
Proof. Consider the undirected graph induced by G on the buyers and items in A(p 1 ) (consider the directed graph, and unorient the edges). Let G 1 = (B 1 ∪ S 1 , E 1 ) be the undirected subgraph of the above induced graph consisting only of the nodes that are reachable from and including t. Next, let G 2 = (B 2 ∪ S 2 , E 2 ) be the subgraph of G 1 induced on the buyers and items in G 1 that are still active at price p 2 , that is, B 2 ∪ S 2 := (B 1 ∪ S 1 ) ∩ A(p 2 ). In other words, the items in S 1 \ S 2 reached the stopping criterion at or before price p 2 . Therefore, by Proposition 3.6, no buyer in B 2 can have an edge to any item in S 1 \ S 2 . Now, let x 1 be the demand vector for buyers in B 1 consisting only of the amount of good that they purchase from the items in S 2 at price p 1 , and let y 1 be the corresponding allocation vector y(p 1 ) on only S 2 . Observe that for i ∈ B 2 , x 1 i = x i (p 1 ), that is, i gets her entire flow from the items in S 2 . Similarly, let ( x 2 , y 2 ) be the analogous vectors at price p 2 , so x 2 i = 0 for i ∈ B 1 \ B 2 (they are already finished) and x 2 i ≤ x i (p 2 ) for i ∈ B 2 (there may be other active items they are purchasing). For every buyer i ∈ B 2 , we can, therefore, conclude that x 2 i ≤ x i (p 2 ) ≤ x i (p 1 ) = x 1 i and so x 2 is dominated by x 1 . Since y 1 , y 2 are min-cost flows, we can directly apply Lemma 2.3 and conclude that for every item t in S 2 including t, c t (y t (p 2 )) = c t (y 2 t ) ≤ c t (y 1 t ) = c t (y t (p 1 )). The next proposition gives us additional insight regarding the stopping condition. It tells us that every item t actually meets the stopping criterion at equality and, therefore, the greater than or equal to sign in Equation (3) is redundant.
Proposition 3.8. For any given item t and fixed k, the stopping condition must be obeyed at equality. Formally, suppose that t meets the stopping criterion at an active price of p, then
Proof. We first claim that for every item t in the active set at an active price of p, lim ϵ →0 c t (y t (p − ϵ )) = c t (y t (p)). First assume that no new item joins the active set at the price p. In a sufficiently small neighborhood around the price p, the contents of the active set cannot change. Moreover, for the restricted instance consisting only of the items and buyers in A(p − ϵ ), y(p − ϵ ) is always a min-cost flow, since the algorithm specifically computes a min-cost flow for the active set.
In the Appendix (available online), we formally prove a lemma that states that given a set of goods having a uniform price, a continuous increase in the prices of these goods leads to a continuous change in their marginal cost (for the min-cost flow) as well. Applying this lemma to the restricted instance provided by A(p), where all the active items are priced at p, we have that lim ϵ →0 c t (y t (p − ϵ )) = c t (y t (p)).
Now, we know that for all p − ϵ < p, item t does not meet the active criterion and, therefore,
Taking the limit on both sides of the inequality and using the fact that the stopping criterion is satisfied at p, we get the desired result. Indeed, if instead of equality we had a strict inequality, then that would imply a jump discontinuity in c t (y t (p)). Now, what if some new item t joins the active set at price p t ? By definition, this would imply that, c t (y t (p)) = p. Then, it is clear that we still have a min-cost flow at p, because for any other item t in the active set, c t (y t (p)) = p. The same proof is, therefore, still applicable.
We also remark here that at every stage of the algorithm, for any buyer i, all the items she uses at that stage must have the same marginal cost. Therefore, given an allocation at any given stage of the algorithm, y, we can use r i ( y) to denote the (unique) marginal cost of the items being used by buyer i in that allocation. We are now ready to prove our first main result regarding our algorithm. We show that for any value of k, the stopping parameter, the solution returned by our algorithm is an envy-free allocation. In addition, the allocation y k is also the minimum cost flow for the demand x k .
Proof of Envy-Freeness
Theorem 3.9. For any given value of k, Algorithm 1 returns prices p k and an envy-free allocation x k , y k . Moreover, y k is also the minimum cost flow corresponding to the demand x k .
Proof. Recall that an allocation is envy-free if (i) all buyers only purchase from the minimally priced items available to them, that is, ∀(i, t ) ∈ E,p k i ≤ p k t , and (ii) for every buyer i and good t, which she receives a non-zero amount of, either
That is, in addition to using the minimally priced items buyers are also using the items with the smallest marginal costs.
Assume by contradiction that the allocation violates the first condition of envy-freeness. Then, for some (i, t ) ∈ E,p k i > p k t . This means that when t reached the stopping criterion at price p k t , i was either active or inactive. Now consider some price p ∈ (p k t ,p k i ). At this price t ∈ S F (p) and i ∈ B A (p) ∪ B I (p). However, by Figure 1 , there can be no edge between i and t, which is a contradiction. Therefore, in the allocation returned by our algorithm, each buyer only purchases from the cheapest set of goods available to her.
The second condition required for envy-freeness, that is, best-response, simply follows from the definition of the algorithm. Consider some buyer i and suppose that this buyer stops being active at price p. From the algorithm, we explicitly compute the min-cost flow at this price, which explicitly involves setting x i for this buyer to be T i when p < λ i (T i ) and λ −1 i (p) otherwise. Next, suppose that the allocation is not a minimum cost flow. Then, ∃(i, t ) ∈ E such that c t (y k t ) < r i ( y k ). We claim that this implies p k t <p k i . Rearranging the equation in the statement of Proposition 3.8, we get that (rememberp k i = p k t for some item t that i receives and r i ( y k ) = c t (y k t ))p
This means that ∃(i, t ) ∈ E with p k t <p k i , which violates the envy-free condition. Therefore, the allocation is also the minimum cost flow satisfying the given demand.
Lower Bound on Prices
The most crucial lemma that allows us to prove our approximation factor is the following lower bound, which we prove on the prices in the revenue maximizing solution p opt . Unlike most existing work, this lower bound allows us to compare our solution directly to the revenue-maximizing solution, instead of using the welfare-maximizing solution as a proxy.
Lemma 3.10. For MHR inverse demand functions, the price of every item t in the profit-maximizing solution p opt is at least its price in p e , that is, p opt t ≥ p e t . Proof. The proof proceeds as follows. We first show that in any solution where some items are priced below their price in p e , a few of these items do not meet the stopping criterion at k = e. Then, we show that for any monotone hazard rate demand function that does not satisfy the stopping criterion at k = e, we can always increase the price on the items and improve the profits thereby contradicting the optimality of p opt .
Assume by contradiction that in the optimal solution some items have a price smaller than their price in p e . Let S min be the subset of such items with the smallest price (call it p min ). Moreover, note that the optimum solution is envy-free and our solution is a min-cost flow. In the Appendix, we prove that under these conditions there must exist some t ∈ S min such that c t (y e t ) ≤ c t (y opt t ). Call this item t min .
Construct a directed graph G' whose vertices are the same as in G but with the following edges E :
=p opt i , that is, t's price coincides with the price of the cheapest item available to i.
Let S + min be the set of items that is reachable from t min and let B + min be the set of buyers that is reachable from t min in this graph G . We make three simple observations here analogous to those made earlier in the proof of Lemma 2.7, where we showed a weaker lower bound on p opt : first, for every item t ∈ S + min , its price must equal p min . Second, every buyer in B + min is only receiving allocations of the items in S + min and has no edge in E to any item outside of S + min also priced at p min . Finally, for every item t ∈ S + min , its marginal cost in OPT is at least c t min (y opt t min ). These three observations imply that in a revenue maximizing solution, for the reduced instance with only the buyers and sellers in B + min and S + min , for the corresponding demand in OPT , the sub-allocation on these items must be a min-cost flow. Since p e t min > p min , t min cannot satisfy the stopping criterion (k = e) based on its price and allocation at OPT , that is,
Moreover, for every other t ∈ S + min , its price in OPT is p min and marginal cost is at least as much as that of t min . Therefore,
Now, our idea is the following: we will uniformly increase the price on only the items in S + min by a sufficiently small amount so the buyers from B + min still use only these items in an envy-free solution. Then, we will use the stopping criterion to show that at the new price, the seller's profit strictly increases thereby violating the fact that OPT is a revenue-maximizing solution.
We letp denote the smallest price in p e ∪ p opt that is strictly larger than p min . It is clear that as long as we increase the price of all t ∈ S + min to some p ∈ [p min ,p), the cheapest items for buyers in B + min will only come from S + min . Moreover, for any other buyer i B + min , the set of cheapest items will not change. Now, gradually increase the price of only the items from S + min , compute the min-cost allocation for the buyers in B + min using only these items. Retain the same price and allocation for every other buyer and item. At any p ∈ [p min ,p), denote byc (p), the smallest marginal cost of any item in S + min at the new allocation at price p. Define a price p + based on one of two cases,
(1) At some minimal p in the domain (p min ,p), the following condition is met:
Recall that the above condition is not met at p = p min . Then, set p + = p . (2) At no p ∈ [p min ,p) is the above condition met. Set p + = 1 2 (p + p min ).
We remark that if some item meets the stopping condition above at price p + at all, then it must be the item(s) whose marginal cost equalsc (p + ) (See Propostion 3.3).
Define p + as the price vector where items in S + min are priced at p + and the rest retain their price in OPT . Let x + and y + be the corresponding buyer demand and envy-free allocation. Our main claim is the following: the profit π + at ( p + , x + , y + ) is larger than the optimal profit π * , which is a contradiction. Consider the difference between the two profits (note that the payments and cost remains the same for buyers and items not in B + min and S + min , respectively):
The first inequality comes from observing that p + dominates p opt and then applying Corollary 2.4. The final equality is from rearranging the allocation from the items to the buyers and using the factp + i andp opt i are simply equal to the respective λ i values. Now, we make a strong claim: that for all
Clearly, this would imply that π + > π * , thereby completing the contradiction. So, for the rest of the proof, we will focus on showing this claim.
Lemma 3.11. For all i ∈ B + , we have that
Proof. Essentially the claim follows from the following two nice properties that hold for any non-increasing MHR function f i (x ). The proofs of the following properties can be found in the online Appendix:
(1) If f i (0) ≥ e f i (x ) for some x, then
x 1 and x 2 > x 1 , then f (x 1 )x 1 > f (x 2 )x 2 . We show how the above two properties give us the desired claim. Define for all i, f i (x ) = λ i (x ) − c (p + ). Clearly, this function still has a monotone hazard rate, since λ i is MHR. Now, by definition of p + , we know that
Therefore, from the first property above, we can conclude that
Now, we use this in the second lemma with x 1 = x + i and x 2 = x opt i . We know
Replacing f i with the actual definition, we get the desired result: 
Final Approximation Factor
We will now provide lower bounds on both π 1 and π 2 as returned by Algorithm 2 and show that for any instance, one of these is close enough to the optimal profit π * . Recall that our 1.88approximation algorithms makes two calls to the generic black-box procedure: π 1 is the profit of the solution returned by Algorithm 1 for k = e and π 2 , the corresponding profit for k = √ e. First some notation: we partition the buyers into sets B H and B L such that for the buyers in B H , the minimally priced item available to them in p opt is not smaller than that available to them in p √ e , that is, i such thatp opt i >p √ e i . We already know due to Lemma 3.10 that all buyers in B L havē p opt i >p e i . Let us denote by z opt the minimum-cost flow corresponding to the buyer demand x opt (since the optimum allocation y opt may not be a min-cost flow). Since the minimum cost flow always costs lesser than or equal to any given allocation, it is okay to compare our solutions with an upper bound on the optimum, which is
In the Appendix, we formally prove a partition lemma, which states that given any envy-free pricing solution and a subset of buyers, we can iteratively partition the profit of the solution into the profit due to the given subset of buyers (taking costs due to the these buyers only) and the remaining profit. Applying this partition lemma to the envy-free profit maximizing solution with B H as the desired subset. Let z opt (B H ) be the respective min-cost flow for only the demand due to buyers in B H in the profit maximizing solution. We then have
As shown above, we have decomposed the profit into that due to B H and due to B L , respectively. For convenience, we will refer to the left term above as π opt (B H ) and the right term as π opt (B L ), then we have shown that π * ≤ π opt (B H ) + π opt (B L ). We now show a simple claim on the marginal costs of buyers in B H and B L . Lemma 3.12. 
. By Convexity arguments, the last term is clearly an upper bound for C ( z opt (B H ) ).
For the final result, we begin with the observation (from Point 2) that
From the previously defined partition lemma, we know that
, which completes the result.
Stopping Condition Related Properties. Finally, we rewrite the stopping conditions for all buyers i, for k = e and k = √ e, respectively, and show a simple lemma based on this: Lower Bound on π 1 : Profit at k = e. We now begin with the main proof by showing a lower bound on π 1 . Recall that π 1 is the solution where all items are priced at p e t . Since p e is a lower bound for the profit maximizing prices, the allocation made to each buyer in the profit maximizing solution (or equivalently, the flow) is smaller than or equal to the allocation in x e . Applying this idea along with the previously mentioned flow partition lemma for dividing the buyers into sets B L , B H , we get that
π 1 : Profit due to buyers in B H Now consider the first term above corresponding to the buyers in B H . We apply the rewritten stopping condition to get the following lower bound: z opt (B H ) ). z opt (B H )) ). And so, we get a final lower bound on the profit due to the buyers in B H :
π 1 : Profit due to buyers in B L We move on to the profit due to the terms in B L and apply Lemma 3.13:
Applying the final claim in Lemma 3.12, we get that z opt (B H )) ). Now, we are in a position to get a final lower bound for the profit due to the terms in B L :
Recall that π opt (B H ) + π opt (B L ) ≥ π * . Our final bound for π 1 reads as follows:
Lower Bound on π 2 : Profit at k = √ e. Now, we move on to π 2 , which is the profit due to the solution returned by our algorithm for k = √ e. Notice that for the buyers in B H , the demand in this solution is larger than the demand in the optimum, whereas it is smaller for the buyers in B L . It may be possible that by increasing the price from the optimum solution for some buyer in B L , we lose most of her flow, and thus we may not be extracting any profit at all from these buyers. Our first main claim leverages a property of MHR functions to show that for every buyer in B L , x √ e i ≥ 1 2 x opt i , that is, due to the price increase, the drop in the buyer's demand cannot be larger than a factor of two.
Consider the function f ( . This is true because r i ( y e ) ≥ r i ( y √ e ) for all i. We formally prove in the Appendix that for any non-increasing MHR function f (x ) and parameters a 1 < a 2 satisfying f (0) = √ e f (a 1 ) ≤ e f (a 2 ), it must be true that a 2 ≤ 2a 1 . Applying this property, we get the desired claim that x √ e i ≥ 1 2 x e i ≥ 1 2 x opt i . Leverage all of these properties, we provide a lower bound for the profit when k = √ e, in terms the profit due to the buyers in B H and (a discounted version of) the profit due to buyers in B L (a supporting lemma can be found in the online Appendix): z opt (B H )) ) .
We will refer to the above two terms as π 2 (B H ) and π 2 (B L ). π 2 : Profit due to buyers in B L : Clearly, since α = 0.5, we immediately have that π 2 (B L ) = 0.5π opt (B L ). Therefore, we only need to focus on bounding π 2 (B H ) in terms of π opt (B H ), which we do below. π 2 : Profit due to buyers in B H : So, we now exclusively focus on the profit due to the terms in B H .
Using the rewritten stopping condition, we see that for all i ∈ B H ,p
). But, we also know that r i ( y √ e ) ≥ r i ( z opt ) ≥ r i ( z opt (B H )) due to Lemma 3.12. Getting back to π 2 , we have
Therefore, our lower bound on π 2 is 1 √ e (π opt (B H )) + 1 2 (π opt (B L )). Recall that π opt (B H ) + π opt (B L ) ≥ π * and π 1 ≥ 1 e (π opt (B H )) + 1 √ e (π opt (B L )).
By definition, the profit due to our algorithm is max(π 1 , π 2 ) ≥ max 1 e (π opt (B H )) + 1 √ e (π opt (B L )), 1 √ e (π opt (B H )) + 1 2 (π opt (B L )) .
(3) Set the price of active items to be P (j) and compute a min-cost best-response allocation for the active buyers, ( x (j), y(j)). (4) Let S F (j) be the set of items that meet the stopping condition at this allocation. (5) Run a binary search for the items in S F (j) in the interval [P (j − 1), P (j)] and remove them at the exact price at which they become finished along with the buyers using them. (6) Add items to the active set whose price in p * is P (j) and the buyers using them in y * . (7) Let B A (j) be the new set of active buyers and S A (j), the active items. (8) Repeat the process.
Before showing correctness of the above algorithm and elucidating upon the "binary search" in Step 6, we show some simple invariants of the above algorithm that prove that the above algorithm "simulates" Algorithm 1.
Lemma 3.15. The following invariants hold during the course of the above Algorithm.
(1) For any j, B A (j) ∪ S A (j) = B A (P (j)) ∪ S A (P (j)).
(2) For any j, all the items in S F (j) meet the stopping criterion in the interval [P (j − 1), P (j)] during the course of Algorithm 1.
Recall that B A (P (j)) ∪ S A (P (j)) denotes the contents of the active set in Algorithm 1 when the active price was P (j). We already know any item that meets the stopping criterion in the interval should show up in S F (j). The above lemma complements this result by saying all items that show up in S F (j) must meet the stopping criterion. Conditional upon Invariant 1 holding up to some iteration j − 1 and invariant 2 holding up to iteration j. We now explain the binary search procedure before proving the invariants. Binary Search: Consider S F (j) and let t ∈ S F (j) be the item that reaches the stopping condition first in [P (j − 1), P (j)] in the original algorithm. Clearly for all p > p in that interval, it must meet the stopping criterion and for p < p, no item in S F (j) could have met the stopping criterion. Therefore, we can effectively use binary search to identify p. Now, we can repeat this for all t ∈ S F (j) in the reduced interval [p, P (j)].
Proof. We show this by induction on j. Clearly, at j = 1, no item meets the stopping criterion, since P (1) = c t (y * t ). This means that the first invariant is also true trivially. Suppose that the invariants are true up to iteration j − 1. Notice that at the beginning of iteration j, we compute a min-cost flow for the items and buyers in B A (j − 1) ∪ S A (j − 1).
Assume by contradiction that at j, ∃t ∈ S F (j) that does not meet the stopping criterion in the interval [P (j − 1), P (j)] in the algorithm. We carefully introduce more notation:
-Let S F (j) be the subset of S F (j) of all the items that do meet the stopping criterion in the interval during the course of the algorithm. -Consider the set of buyers and items belonging to the active set at both P (j − 1) and P (j), that is, they did not meet the stopping criterion in the desired interval. Let B alд (j) be the set of such buyers and S alд (j) be the set of such items. It is not hard to see that B alд (j) ⊆ B A (j − 1) and S alд (j) ⊆ S A (j − 1). Moreover, S alд (j) ∪ S F (j) = S A (j − 1).
-Let x alд (j) be the demand of the buyers in B alд (j) at price P (j) and let y alд (j) be the corresponding min-cost flow using only the items in S alд (j). Indeed, in algorithm 1, the buyers in B alд (j) are only using the items in S alд (j) at active price P (j). Now, it is not hard to see that no buyer in B alд (j) has an edge to any item in S F (j) (Recall Figure 1 ). Define the demand vector x (j) as x (j) but counting only the flow sent to items in S alд (j). For all buyers in B alд (j), x i (j) = x i (j). Now, apply Corollary 2.5 for the following two instances:
(1) (B alд (j), S alд (j)) with demand x alд (j) and flow y alд (j);
(2) (B A (j − 1), S alд (j)) with demand x (j) with flow being y(j) but only for the items in S alд (j).
Since t ∈ S alд (j), this means that c t (y alд t ) ≤ c t (y t (j)). But, we already know that t did not meet the stopping criteria at P (j), that is,
And, so, t could have not met the stopping criteria in y(j), which is a contradiction. The second invariant follows almost immediately. We know that the items that reached the stopping criterion in Algorithm 1 in (P (j − 1), P (j)] constitute S F (j). Let B F (j) be the corresponding buyers who also became finished along with the items in the same interval but in the original algorithm. Clearly, B F (j) ⊆ B A (j − 1) as per definition. Clearly, these buyers have edges to at least one item in S F (j). Now, suppose that the binary search algorithm has found a price p where item t exactly meets the stopping criterion, and suppose that some buyer i ∈ B F (j) who has an edge to this item has not been removed yet. Since we only compute min-cost flows, either this buyer is using t or some item with a marginal cost equal to that of t, say t . Indeed, t 's marginal cost cannot be smaller than that of t, because that means that t would have been removed first. Therefore, we also remove t and along with it buyer i.
Theorem 3.16. The algorithm in Section 3.4 returns the same solution as Algorithm 1 for any value of k.
Proof. We just need to show that every item t has the same price in the efficient algorithm as it does in p k . We show this inductively on the set of distinct prices in p k . Let S p be some set of items priced at p in that vector and let B p be the buyers using these items. We only have to show that in the efficient algorithm, these items have the same price and these buyers are also using only the items in S p . Suppose that p ∈ (P (j − 1), P (j)] for some j. We know that B p ⊆ B A (j − 1) and S p ⊆ S A (j − 1) as per Lemma 3.15. Now, as per the binary search algorithm, we would be searching in an interval (p , P (j)] such that for the active price strictly between p and p, no item would meet the stopping criterion. Also, note that the buyers in B p have not been removed at this stage of the binary search, because they do not have edges to any items that finished before price p. Therefore, we know that the binary search converges up on price p and at this point we have to remove both item B p and S p , items not in S p cannot meet the stopping criterion and have to have a marginal cost larger than those in S p . So, buyers in B p must only be using items in S p , because this is a min-cost flow.
Running Time and Numerical Approximation. We now argue that the running time of the procedure presented in this section is polynomial in the input and the level of numerical accuracy desired. Since we are in a real-valued setting, it is important to note that "computing" a solution means getting within arbitrary precision ϵ (in terms of the L ∞ norm of the two solution vectors) of the desired solution; the exact solution may not be computable efficiently. Moreover, computing both the social welfare maximizing solution (Convex Program Equation (2)) and min-cost allocation for a given demand vector involves convex optimization over linear constraints; this can be done in time polynomial in log( 1 ϵ ) and the input parameters (Hochbaum and Shanthikumar 1990) . Consider the algorithm presented in this section: for some iteration j, recall that S F (j) is the set of items that meet the stopping condition at active price P (j) but not at P (j − 1). Now, for every item t ∈ S F (j), we run a binary search on the prices in [P (j − 1), P (j)] to identify the smallest price at which item t meets the stopping condition (up to a desired level of accuracy). This binary search procedure involves at most 1 + log( P (j )−P (j−1) ϵ ) = O (log( λ max ϵ )) min-cost flow computations. Since there are |S | items in total, the total number of min-cost flow computations is O (|S | log( λ max ϵ )). In conclusion, the run time of the algorithm is polynomial in |B|, |S |, and log( λ max ϵ ). Assuming that the inverse demand and production cost functions are continuously differentiable, it is not hard to see that the difference between the profit of the "efficiently computed" solution and that of the desired solution can be made arbitrarily small. This is due to the fact that the profit due to each good is a smooth function of the price on the good and its total consumption, both of these parameters can computed to be arbitrarily close to their values in the desired solution. We conclude by remarking that despite the approximate nature of the computed solution, the allocation still remains envy-free. Our efficient procedure involves computing ϵ-approximate min-cost flow allocations for fixed price (and hence demand) vectors. Even when the computed allocation is only approximately of minimum cost, buyers still purchase only from the cheapest goods available to them (the min-cost flow is computed on the subgraph where each buyer only has edges to the cheapest items available to her), and hence the solutions are envy-free.
Approximating Revenue and Social Welfare Simultaneously
For sellers who care about both revenue and welfare, as is common in repeated mechanisms where you want the buyers to "leave happy," we also provide the following guarantees.
Theorem 3.17. Algorithm 1 for k = e provides an envy-free solution, which is an e-approximation to the optimal profit with at least half the optimal welfare.
Proof. The first part, bounding the profit, is rather easy. We simply refer to the Proof of Theorem 3.2, where we used π 1 to denote the profit from the k = e solution. We have already shown that
This means that π 1 ≥ 1 e (π opt (B H ) + π opt (B L )) ≥ 1 e (π * ), and so the profit returned by the algorithm is at most a factor e smaller than the optimal profit. We now move on to the social welfare. The social welfare of our solution and the optimum are as follows:
= SW ( x e , y e ) + Welfare Loss.
For the rest of the proof, we will attempt to bound the lost welfare in terms of the social welfare of our solution. In particular, we will show that the lost welfare for MHR functions cannot be any larger than the welfare of our solution, which will give us the half approximation. We know that for every i the following is true for k = e due to Proposition 3.8 (recall that λ i (x e i ) =p e i ):
Look at the function λ i (x ) − r i ( y e ): since the latter term is a constant, we know that this function has a monotone hazard rate. Applying a simple property of MHR functions (proof in the online Appendix), we get that for all i,
Next, we claim that the total difference in production costs at the optimum and our solution is at least i r i ( y e )(x * i − x e i ). This is formally shown in the Appendix. Therefore, the following is an upper bound for the Lost Welfare:
For every i, the second term inside the integral is a constant and so the function inside the integral also has a monotone hazard rate in the desired interval. This means that ∀x ∈ [x e i , x * i ],
So, we can bound every integral as follows:
Now, consider λ i (x * i ). Since our solution p e dominates p * , it is not hard to see that λ i (x * i ) ≥ r i ( y * ) ≥ r i ( y e ) (Lemma 2.3). So, we finally bound the lost welfare as follows:
The last step is true, because for any given solution, the profit cannot be larger than the social welfare of the same solution. So, the optimum social welfare is SW ( x e , y e ) + Lost Welfare, which is no larger than 2 · SW ( x e , y e ). This completes the proof.
This result provides an additional, stronger revenue-welfare tradeoff. Suppose we run the algorithm in Theorem 3.17 and obtain welfare that is exactly 1 α of optimum (we know that α ≤ 2). Then, our analysis guarantees that the profit of the resulting solution is actually at least max( 1 e , α −1 α ) of optimum; for instance, if α = 2, then we actually get half the optimal revenue. Corollary 3.18. ∃α ∈ [1, 2] such that the solution returned by Theorem 3.17 has a fraction 1 α of the optimum welfare and max( 1 e , α −1 α )) of the optimum revenue. The value of the parameter α depends on the instance.
RELAXING THE UNIFORM PEAK VALUATION ASSUMPTION
In this section, we drop the uniform peak assumption and consider revenue and welfare maximization in general markets. Without Assumption 3, it is possible that for a given instance, different buyer types may have different values of λ i (0). In such markets, it is no longer possible to design algorithms that approximate the optimum revenue to within a constant factor. On the positive front, our main result is an algorithm that obtains one-fourth of the optimum social welfare and simultaneously approximates the optimum revenue to a factor that is logarithmic in the distortion in the λ i (0) values between different buyer types. Formally, we define the parameter Δ to be the ratio of the maximum value of λ i (0) over all i to the minimum, that is,
Then, we give an O (1 + log Δ)-approximation algorithm for the revenue maximization problem. From our reduction in Proposition 2.2, we know that without the uniform peak assumption, the revenue maximization problem is quite general and, therefore, unlikely to admit good (constantfactor) approximation algorithms. Indeed, in markets with a finite number of buyers, the performance of the best known (and perhaps the best possible) algorithms degrades as the number of buyers increases. Such algorithms are not suitable for large markets. The main high level contribution of this work is approximating revenue based on a parameter Δ that is better suited for large markets as it depends only on how different the various buyer types are. It is reasonable to expect that even when the λ i 's are not the same, they are closely distributed if all buyer types are interested in a similar type of good. Our result shows that in such markets, we can still extract a good fraction of the optimum revenue and welfare.
In addition, we require a slightly stronger assumption on the cost functions than just convexity. We call a production cost function C t (x ) doubly convex if its derivative c t (x ) is also convex with c t (0) = 0. Surprisingly, without the doubly convex assumption, we show that this problem admits no good approximation algorithm. We begin by adapting our algorithms from Section 3 for the case where buyer inverse demand functions have different peaks.
General Ascending-Price Procedure
Notice that other than the stopping condition, Algorithm 1 itself is independent of the peak buyer valuations (λ max ). To adapt our general ascending price procedure for the case with different peak valuations, it therefore suffices to redefine just the stopping procedure. For the rest of this section, we will consider Algortihm 1 with the modified stopping condition as defined in Equation (5). For any given instance, define λ max 0 to be the smallest peak of any inverse demand function and λ max 1 to be the largest peak valuation, so Δ = λ max 1 λ max 0 . Then, the modified stopping condition is given by
The above change introduces a new element into the analysis of the algorithm: an item that is inactive may already satisfy the stopping criterion if their initial price c t (y * t ) = p * t ≥ λ max 0 . The the market and parameters such as |B| or |S |, and therefore is more nuanced from a large market perspective.
(2) Approximation factors that are logarithmic in the total size of the support, that is, O (
where λ min 0 is the smallest value held by any buyer. By definition, λ min 0 ≤ λ max 0 , and therefore, our O (1 + log Δ)-bound provides a strict improvement over previous "support size"dependent factors as long as buyer distributions are not point masses.
Proof.
Claim 4.1. For all j between 1 and 1 + log(Δ), y(j) is a min-cost flow for the demand x (j).
Proof. For a given j, look at the prices. Items are priced at either e j−1 λ max 0 or at p e t if p e t > e j−1 λ max 0 . The solution is envy-free by definition. So divide the buyers and items as follows: let S H be the set of items with price higher than e j−1 λ max 0 and let B H be the buyers using these items. Define S L as the items with price e j−1 λ max 0 and B L as the corresponding buyers using these items. Now, for a solution to be a min-cost flow, all buyers should be sending flow on the items with the smallest marginal cost available to them.
By definition, we have two min-cost sub-flows: 1) buyers in B L are using the cheapest possible allocation using only the items in S L ; 2) the same is true for B H and S H , this is because for these entities, both the prices and the allocation are exactly the same as in p e , x e , y e . So, as was the case before, we only need to consider cross-edges. Moreover, since the solution is envy-free, there can be no edges going from buyers in B H to items in S L . What about the reverse case, can there be a buyer i in B L and an item t in S H such that c t (y t (j)) = c t (y e t ) < r i ( y(j))? Consider S L and B L , but in our first solution y e . Recall that these items must have a price smaller than or equal to e j−1 λ max 0 in p e . Clearly, since our solution is both envy-free and a min-cost flow, it is clear that buyers in B L can only receive allocations from S L in our solution. Moreover, no buyer from B H has an edge to items in S L . Finally, by definition, the buyers in B L have a smaller demand in x (j) as compared to x e . Therefore, applying Lemma 2.3 for the reduced sub-instance (B L , S L ), we get that r i ( y(j)) ≤ r i ( y e ) for any buyer i in B L . But, since y e is a full min-cost flow, it is true r i ( y(j)) ≤ c t (y e t ) for any t that i has an edge to including items in S H . This completes the proof.
As with our proof of Theorem 3.2, the approximation factor depends very crucially on nontrivial lower bounds that we show for the optimal prices p opt .
Lemma 4.3. The price of every item t in the profit-maximizing solution p opt is at least its price in p e .
The proof is somewhat similar to that of Lemma 3.10, so we will only sketch the relevant details. define the sets S + min and B + min accordingly. The only additional observation that we need for this case is that S + min cannot include any type A item, since p min < p e t min ≤ λ max 0 , The rest of the proof is extremely similar to what was shown in Lemma 3.10. Since p e t min > p min , t min cannot satisfy the new stopping criterion (k = e) based on its price and allocation at OPT . Moreover, for every other t ∈ S + min , its price is p min and marginal is at least as much as that of t min . Therefore,
Consider increasing the price of only the items in S + min and recomputing the min-cost flow for the buyers in B + min for any p. We define the quantities p + andc (p) exactly as mentioned in the proof of Lemma 3.10. Let p + be the full price vector when items in S + min have a price p + and other items retain their price in OPT . Also, define the corresponding best-response demand x + and envy-free allocation y + .
Our main claim is the following: the profit at ( p + , x + , y + ) is larger than the optimal profit, which is a contradiction. The proof proceeds in the exact same manner as that of Lemma 3.10. By definition, for all p smaller than p + , no item meets the stopping criterion in Equation (6). We remark that if some item meets the stopping condition above at price p + at all, then it must be the item(s) whose marginal cost equalsc (p + ) (See Proposition 3.3).
Once again, we can bound the difference in profits as with Lemma 3.10, and make the claim that for all i,
The only property required to show the claim that we make is f (0) ≥ e f i (x + i ). But, from the stopping criterion, we know that
Indeed, the above inequalities are true, because for all i, λ i (0) ≥ λ max 0 . The rest of the proof follows.
We are now ready to prove our main theorem, that the solution returned by Algorithm 3 gives us a good fraction of both revenue and welfare. We know that in p opt , every item is priced between its price in p e and λ max 1 , that is, the latter being the largest valuation any infinitesimal buyer may hold for the items. Next, define z opt to be the min-cost flow for the buyer demand x opt , since y opt is envy-free but not necessarily cost minimizing.
Finally, for every j, define SW (j) to be the social welfare of the solution ( p(j), x (j), y(j)). Let π * be the optimal profit and SW * be the welfare of the social welfare maximizing solution. We show our result using two small lemmas, which we state first and then prove after showing how this leads to the main result.
Lemma 4.4. SW (0) ≥ π * (the optimal profit) and SW (0) ≥ 1 2 SW * . Lemma 4.5. For all j, SW (j) − SW (j + 1) ≤ 4.5 · π (j).
We show how these lemmas lead to the main theorem and then prove the actual lemmas. First, we show that Algorithm 3 must return at least one such solution that satisfies the desired lower bound on the profit. Summing up Lemma 4.5 from j = 0 to j = 1 + log(Δ), we get that SW (0) ≤ 4.5 j π (j). If the algorithm does not return even one such j, then it means that for every 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 + log Δ, π (j) < 1 2 × 4.5
Summing up from j = 0 to 1 + log Δ, we get that SW (0) < SW (0), which is clearly a contradiction. Thus, the algorithm must return some solution. Suppose that the index j returned by the algorithm is j * . Then, by definition, every j < j * must satisfy Equation (9).
The revenue bound in the bicriteria result is trivial to see, because SW (0) ≥ π * and our solution satisfies
.
Now, consider the following quantity:
So, SW (0) − SW (j * ) ≤ 1 2 SW (0), which implies that our solution's social welfare SW (j * ) is at least half of SW (0), which is one-fourth of the optimal welfare by Lemma 4.4. We now prove the small lemmas.
(Proof of Lemma 4.4)
We know that in the revenue-maximizing solution, every buyer's demand is smaller than in x e . Also recall that z opt is the min-cost flow for the demand x opt . Let SW ( x opt , y opt ) be the welfare of the profit maximizing solution. It is not hard to see that SW ( x opt , y opt ) ≥ π * , because the value of every infinitesimal buyer is at least the price that she is paying. The costs are the same in both cases. Next, recall that
We can write SW (0) as follows (recall that λ i is decreasing as x increases, and so the minimum value in the interval x opt i to x e i is λ i (x e i ), which in turn is the payment by the buyer): Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare 16:37 y 2 and y e must have the exact same total allocation on all items. On the other hand, notice that the min-cost flow of just the demands of buyers in B is exactly z opt . Therefore, we can apply the flow partition lemma (first stated in Section 3.3 and formally proved in the Appendix) for buyers B and B and obtain that C ( y e ) − C ( z opt ) ≤ i ∈B r i ( y 2 )(x e i − x opt i ). Moreover, we know that p e ≥ p * , and so for all i, r i ( y e ) ≤p * i ≤p e i . Therefore, for all i , r i ( y 2 ) = r i ( y e ) ≤p e i . Therefore, we know that the term
. Therefore, the second term in the lower bound for SW (0) above is non-negative, and we can bound SW (0) as
as desired.
Next, we need to show that SW (0) ≥ 1 2 SW * . This proof is exactly identical to the bicriteria result we showed in Theorem 3.17. Notice that the only requirement for the theorem was that for all i,
To show that this still holds, consider f i (x ) = λ i (x ) − r i ( y e ). This function is MHR and at x = x e i satisfies f i (0) ≥ e f i (x e i ) by the stopping condition. So, using a property of MHR functions that was stated in the proof of Lemma 3.11, we see that Equation (10) is valid here as well. Notice that for any i whose price is larger than λ max 0 , f i (x e i ) = λ i (x e i ) − r i ( y e ) = 0, since all of its items were inactive throughout the runtime of the algorithm.
(Proof of Lemma 4.5): SW (j) − SW (j + 1) ≤ 4.5π (j) Recall that for all i, x i (j + 1) is no larger than x i (j):
The last inequality is true, because it just states that the profit made at π (j + 1) is non-negative, that is, y(j + 1) ). Now, look at the profit π (j): C ( y(j) ).
We claim that for every i,p i (j) is at least 1 e λ i (x i (j + 1)) = 1 ep i (j + 1). This is true by definition of the price vectors, because we are increasing by at most a factor e. By definition,p i (j + 1) = max(p e i , e j λ max 0 ). Ifp i (j + 1) =p e i , then the price at jth iteration is also the same and so the 1 e factor is trivially true. Otherwise,p i (j) = max(p e i , e j−1 λ max C ( y(j) )
Our next and final claim is that C ( y(j)) ≤ 0.5( i ∈Bpi (j)x i (j)). For any doubly convex function, C t (x ) ≤ 0.5x · c t (x ). Moreover, we know that since x (j) ≤ x * , r i ( y(j)) ≤ r i ( y * ) ≤p i (j). All these identities simply come from the fact that reducing demand can only lead to a reduction in marginal cost. Therefore, we have
Consider the ratio between the difference in welfare to the profit:
It is not hard to see that the right-hand side is largest when C ( y(j)) = 0.5 ipi (j ) x i (j), and so
Moreover, we also prove that this result is actually tight under mild complexity assumptions and that the doubly convex assumption is required.
Proposition 4.6.
(1) There cannot be a O (Δ k )-approximation algorithm for any constant k > 0 for UDP in large markets with MHR inverse demand and convex costs (instead of doubly convex) unless N P ⊆ DT I ME (n (loд c n) ) for some constant c.
(2) There is no O (log 1−ϵ (Δ))-approximation algorithm for any constant ϵ > 0 for UDP in large markets with MHR inverse demand and doubly convex costs unless N P ⊆ DT I ME (n (loд c n) ) for some constant c.
Proof. The reductions are from U DP-UV , that is, the unit demand pricing problem in small markets with uniform valuations and unlimited supply. It was shown in (Chalermsook et al. 2012 ) that this problem is log 1−ϵ (|B|)-hard to approximate for any constant ϵ > 0, unless N P ⊆ DT I ME (n (loд ϵ n) ), where ϵ is some constant that depends only on ϵ. Fixing some value of ϵ > 0, this implies that U DP-UV cannot have a constant factor approximation algorithm unless N P ⊆ DT I ME (n (loд c n) ), where c is now a constant (since we have fixed some ϵ > 0). We will now show both our hardness results by reductions to UDP-UV.
(Statement 1):
Assume by contradiction that ∃ a O (Δ k )-approximation algorithm for some constant k > 0. Then, we show that for UDP with uniform valuations and unlimited supply, there must exist a 2 k constant factor approximation algorithm. Consider some instance of UDP-Uniform valuations with buyer set B and items S . Suppose that the maximum buyer value is v max and minimum buyer value is v min > 0. Consider the following linear transformation on the buyer values:
Define an instance of our problem with one buyer type i for every buyer i ∈ B . The inverse demand function is uniform as defined above. Moreover, the item set coincides with S but now having the cost function C t (x ) = x for every single item. Look at the demand functions: λ max 1 = 2 and λ max 0 ≥ 1. Therefore, Δ = 2 and we can always obtain a 2 k -approximate solution for this instance. We show that this gives a 2 k -approximate solution for the original UDP problem as well.
Consider any solution p, x, y of our problem. Assume without loss of generality (see proposition 2.2) that every buyer receives an integral amount of one single good, that is, y t (i) = 0 or 1 for every i. Consider the following price vector p 2 defined as p 2 t = v max (p t − 1).
We claim that the revenue of ( p 2 , x, y) for the original U DP-UV problem is exactly the revenue of our solution scaled by a factor v max . First, we show that the allocation is envy-free for these new prices. It is not hard to see that the transformation is linear and so the order of prices is maintained for the items, which means that every buyer's cheapest item set remains the same. Next, suppose buyer i is sending flow on item t for our solution. Then,
So, the flow is definitely feasible. The profit of our solution is t (p t y t − C t (y t )) = t ((p t − 1)y t = t 1 v max (p 2 t y t ). So, this is just a scaled-down version of the profit of the UDP problem. Therefore, every solution of our problem can be converted to a solution of UDP with scaled profits. It is not hard to see that the same is applicable for the reverse direction as well and so the optima must coincide. So, any 2 k -Approximate solution for our problem must retain this factor for the original UDP problem as well. For a constant k > 0, this would imply that UDP-UV admits a constant factor algorithm, which is a contradiction.
(Statement 2):
The reduction will proceed as follows. Given an instance of UDP-UV with a set of N small buyers, we will reduce it to another instance of UDP-UV, in which the ratio of the largest to the smallest valuation is at most 2N . Moreover, we show that the new instance retains the value of the optimum solution up to a constant factor. Then, if we reduce the new instance using Proposition 2.2, we obtain an instance of our problem in large markets with doubly convex costs such that Δ ≤ 2N . It then follows that a O (log 1−ϵ (Δ))-approximation algorithm for our problem for a constant ϵ > 0 provides a O (log 1−ϵ (N ))-approximation algorithm for UDP-UV, which is a contradiction.
Consider some instance I 1 of UDP-UV with a set B 1 of N buyers and unlimited supply, such that the maximum valuation of any buyer is v max . Then, it is not hard to see that the optimum revenue OPT (I 1 ) for this instance is at least v max , for example, consider pricing all of the goods at v max and allocate one item to the buyer with the largest value.
Next, consider an instance I 2 of UDP-UV with the same set of goods (with unlimited supply) as I 1 and a buyer set B 2 containing all of the buyers in B 1 whose valuations are at least v max 2N , that is, i ∈ B 2 iff i ∈ B 1 and v i ≥ v max 2N . We claim that OPT (I 2 ) ≥ OPT (I 1 )
2
. To see why, the total revenue due to the buyers in B 1 \ B 2 in OPT (I 1 ) is at most the sum of valuations of these buyers, which in turn is bounded from above by v max 2N N ≤ v max 2 ≤ OPT (I 1 )
. Therefore, the total revenue due to the buyers in B 2 in the optimum solution for I 1 is at least v max 2 , which is clearly a lower bound for OPT (I 2 ). Now, we are ready to reduce I 2 to an instance of UDP in large markets with Δ ≤ 2N . Notice that unlimited supply is clearly a special case of doubly convex costs. Let us apply the reduction in Proposition 2.2 to I 2 to obtain an instance of our problem. The largest valuation of any buyer in I 2 is v max and the smallest valuation is at least v max 2N . Therefore, for the reduced instance of our problem in large markets, Δ ≤ 2N .
Assume by contradiction that UDP in large markets with doubly convex costs admits a O (log 1−ϵ (Δ))-approximation algorithm for profit. Since Δ ≤ 2N , we know that the approximation factor is O (log 1−ϵ (N )). Given that the reduction in Proposition 2.2 retains the value of the optimum solution, we in turn get a O (log 1−ϵ (N ))-approximate solution for I 2 . Now, due to unlimited supply, it is not hard to see that a pricing solution that obtains a c-approximation to revenue for I 2 obtains (at least) a 2c-approximation to revenue for I 1 . Therefore, the O (log 1−ϵ (N ))-approximation for I 2 yields the same asymptotic-approximation factor for I 1 .
In conclusion, using the above reduction, a O (log 1−ϵ (Δ))-approximation algorithm for UDP in large markets with doubly convex costs implies a O (log 1−ϵ (N ))-approximation algorithm for UDP-UV, which is a contradiction.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we designed revenue and welfare maximization algorithms for the extremely wellstudied problem of envy-free pricing for unit-demand buyers. The setting of large markets with production costs that we consider is perhaps more attuned to the mechanism that simply chooses one price per good (item pricing) than previous settings (Briest and Krysta 2011; Guruswami et al. 2005 ) that looked at markets with a finite number of buyers with the seller being fully aware of every buyer's valuation. In contrast, our model accommodates the fact that the seller may only be aware of buyer valuations in aggregate.
At a high level, one of the main contributions of this work is the general ascending-price framework provided in Algorithm 1 for developing specific revenue or welfare maximization algorithms for instances with production costs. Compared to other work on pricing with unlimited or limited supply, which our model generalizes, the presence of convex production costs requires us to employ techniques from the theory of network flows to increase prices in a way that balances the load (allocation) across multiple items. The main applications of our framework are a 1.88approximation algorithm for maximizing solely revenue and an e-approximation to revenue that also simultaneously provides a half approximation to social welfare; both of these results hold under the modest assumption that different buyer types have the same support for their (inverse) demands. Given the ubiquity of ascending-price algorithms, we believe our framework will find applications in many other settings involving production costs.
Where do our results lie amidst the landscape of research on envy-free pricing? First, recall that the problem of item pricing in finite markets with unit-demand buyers has eluded any approximation factor better than Θ(loд|B|), and going by recent complexity results, it seems unlikely that a better poly-time approximation algorithm even exists. Second, as highlighted in Section 2, our large market with production costs model strictly generalizes the previously studied finite market setting even when the inverse demand functions are MHR. Although our setting generalizes an already hard problem, the natural interpretation of large markets allows us to consider "more structured" but well-motivated classes of problems. For instance, one such reasonable assumption, the uniform-peak assumption, allows us to design constant factor approximation algorithms for revenue maximization; this assumption is uninteresting in finite markets. However, even without this assumption, we obtain a O (1 + log Δ) approximation to revenue where Δ is a measure of how "far apart" different buyer types are. We believe that this parameter Δ is better suited to large markets than the number of buyer types |B|.
Our results indicate that large markets provide a useful framework to identify settings that admit good revenue maximization algorithms. As mentioned in the previous sections, ours is among the handful of algorithms that obtain a constant factor approximation to revenue without resorting to any assumptions on the structure of the bipartite graph, that is, which buyer has access to what items. Finally, we also reiterate that despite the extensive body of work on envy-free pricing, ours is among the first to look at bi-criteria algorithms for maximizing both revenue and social welfare simultaneously.
Future Work and Open Questions
An immediate research goal is to extend the results in this article to markets where the buyer behavior is more complex than simply unit-demand, such as single-mindedness or even indifference among multiple equivalent bundles (multi-mindedness or AND-OR buyers). At a more fundamental level, our work gives rise to several interesting open questions: we highlight two of them here: (i) Given that the inverse demand model only captures buyers who (in addition to demand sets) are characterized by a single parameter, is it possible to compactly express buyers who have different valuations for different (sets of) items in a manner that allows us to extend our results to the more general case? And (ii) Can we characterize the largest possible sub-class of large markets that admits constant factor revenue maximization algorithms?
